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The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, which first took shape in Bohr’s landmark
1928 paper on complementarity, remains an enigma. Although many physicists are skeptical about
the necessity of Bohr’s philosophical conclusions, his pragmatic message about the importance of
the whole experimental arrangement is widely accepted. It is, however, generally also agreed that
the Copenhagen interpretation has no direct consequences for the mathematical structure of quan-
tum mechanics. Here I show that the application of Bohr’s main concepts of complementarity to
the subsystems of a closed system requires a change in the definition of the quantum state. The
appropriate definition is as an equivalence class similar to that used by von Neumann to describe
macroscopic subsystems. He showed that such equivalence classes are necessary in order to maximize
information entropy and achieve agreement with experimental entropy. However, the significance of
these results for the quantum theory of measurement has been overlooked. Current formulations of
measurement theory are therefore manifestly in conflict with experiment. This conflict is resolved
by the definition of the quantum state proposed here.
Introduction. Despite nearly a century of effort, re-
search into the foundations of quantum mechanics re-
mains a Tower of Babel. Weinberg describes the situation
well [1]: “It is a bad sign that those physicists today who
are most comfortable with quantum mechanics do not
agree with one another about what it all means.” Many
physicists believe that the most contentious issue, the
measurement problem, was solved long ago by some vari-
ant of orthodoxy [2], and that the only remaining prob-
lem is with “a set of people” [3]. However, the orthodox
solution has been criticized by many others, including
Gell-Mann, who lamented that “Niels Bohr brainwashed
a whole generation of theorists into thinking that the job
was done [in the 1920s]” [4].
Some of the more prevalent tongues heard in the Tower
are those of the Copenhagen [5–7] and Princeton [8, 9]
schools (each of which has some claim to orthodoxy), the
Everett relative-states or many-worlds theory [10–12],
consistent histories [13], pilot-wave or hidden-variables
models [13], dynamical-reduction models [14, 15], and a
range of approaches influenced by the concepts of quan-
tum information, including reconstruction efforts [16]
and QBism [17]. A cross-section of the diversity of cur-
rent opinion can be found in conference surveys [18] and
interviews [19]. Decoherence theory [20–23] has become
increasingly popular, in no small part because it is said to
have a foot in both the Copenhagen and Everett camps
[21, 22, 24]; with the advent of quantum Darwinism [25],
decoherence theory is now also viewed as a branch of
quantum information theory.
The reconciliation of Bohr and Everett achieved thus
far by decoherence theory is, however, rather limited,
with Copenhagen ideas entering mainly via the language
by which the results of decoherence theory can be de-
scribed. The difficulty that many physicists have experi-
enced in putting the amorphous Copenhagen philosophy
to practical use is crystallized in the words of Mehra,
as reported by Bell [26]: “Though Dirac appreciated and
admired Bohr greatly, he told me that he did not find any
great significance in Bohr’s principles of correspondence
and complementarity because they did not lead to any
mathematical equations.” Bell responded [26] by saying
that “I absolutely endorse this opinion” and added that
he could not explain complementarity because he “never
got the hang of it.” This opinion seems to be shared
by most authors of quantum-mechanics textbooks, whose
work is dominated by the mathematics of the Princeton
school, with at most a few paragraphs of verbal garnish
on the Copenhagen philosophy.
Here I show that a unification of the core concepts
of Bohr and Everett does indeed lead to new equations.
The key concepts in this regard are Bohr’s emphasis on
the whole experimental arrangement—which implies that
the properties of a measured microscopic subsystem ac-
quire meaning only through its interaction with a macro-
scopic measuring apparatus and that “unperformed ex-
periments have no results” [27]—and Everett’s insistence
that all relevant subsystems, including those associated
with a measuring apparatus or observer, be included in
the quantum-mechanical description. A merger of this
type can be viewed as a long-delayed but inevitable con-
sequence of Bohr’s capitulation to Einstein by including
the apparatus in the domain of applicability of Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty relations [7]. Such a merger was much
desired by Wheeler during his unsuccessful attempt to
mediate between Bohr and Everett [11, 28].
As shown here, a consistent combination of these ideas
requires a change in the definition of a quantum state.
The appropriate definition is not as a ray or density op-
erator in Hilbert space, but as an equivalence class of
stable information. Vital components of this definition
have appeared previously in the work of von Neumann
[29], Landau and Lifshitz [30], and Zurek [31], but always
in isolation, never as a coherent whole. This formulation
of the quantum state has important experimental impli-
cations for the entropy of macroscopic subsystems [29].
A separate paper [32] provides further details of this the-
ory and shows that this definition of a quantum state
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2solves—in the limited sense of emergence—the problem
of outcomes, which is the last outstanding part of the
quantum measurement problem [23]. Perhaps this empir-
ically meaningful unification of two of the major strands
of thought in the foundations of quantum mechanics may
help to resolve some differences of opinion in this field.
Direct and indirect reductions. Let us start by con-
sidering a set A of subsystems, each of which interacts
strongly with its environment and therefore decoheres
rapidly. Such a subsystem is said to be integrated with its
environment. The set of integrated subsystems contains
those exhibiting quasiclassical behavior, including macro-
scopic measuring apparatuses. Subsystems in set B may
be isolated in the sense that they interact weakly with
their environments, apart perhaps from occasional strong
interactions with measuring apparatuses in set A. In-
tegrated subsystems are typically macroscopic, whereas
isolated subsystems are typically microscopic. The com-
posite system AB is assumed to be closed—i.e., it does
not interact with anything else.
In this closed system, a state vector generally has the
entangled form
|ψ〉 =
∑
α,β
cαβ |ψAα 〉|ψBβ 〉 (cαβ ∈ C), (1)
in which {|ψAα 〉} and {|ψBβ 〉} are complete orthonormal
basis sets in A and B, respectively. This can always be
written as a relative-state expansion [10, 30]
|ψ〉 =
∑
α
|ψAα 〉|ϕBα 〉, (2)
in which
|ϕBα 〉 =
∑
β
cαβ |ψBβ 〉 (3)
is the state in B relative to |ψAα 〉 in A.
Consider now a typical quantum measurement situ-
ation, whereby a macroscopic apparatus in A interacts
with a microscopic subsystem in B. The outcome of such
a measurement is conventionally described as a reduction
process generated by an exhaustive orthonormal set P of
projection operators Pi:
P = {Pi | P †i Pj = δijPi,
∑
i
Pi = 1}. (4)
Note that in decoherence theory, the set P and the sub-
systems used to define A and B are not given a pri-
ori. Rather, they are derived from a variational principle
known as the “predictability sieve” [22], which selects
projectors and subsystems [32] by the criteria of stability
and predictability.
According to von Neumann [8] and most quantum-
mechanics textbooks, the projectors Pi act either on the
“measured” subsystem in B or on all subsystems to-
gether. However, as stressed by Landau and Lifshitz
[30], the measurement process is better described by us-
ing projectors that act nontrivially only in A:
Pi = P
A
i ⊗ 1B , PAi =
∑
α∈i
|ψAα 〉〈ψAα |. (5)
The reason for this is simply that we obtain our infor-
mation about the outcome of the measurement from the
measuring apparatus, not from the microscopic subsys-
tem. The vector subspace defined by the projector PAi is
usually associated with a set of collective variables, such
as those in which the center of mass of the apparatus
pointer lies in some given volume in coordinate space.
But in a typical quantum measurement situation, all of
the states |ψAα 〉 in this subspace may have the same rel-
ative state |ϕBα 〉. The direct reduction of A generated
by Pi thus leads to an indirect reduction of B, in which
the state of B is (in this example) reduced to the pure
state |ϕBα 〉. This indirect reduction mechanism [30] is an
explicit implementation of Bohr’s principle [5] that the
properties of a microscopic subsystem acquire meaning
only through their correlations with those of a quasiclas-
sical apparatus.
The reduction process is most convenient to write in
terms of density operators ρ, where ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| in the
special case of a pure state described above. It can be
separated conceptually into two stages, the first of which
is the elimination of interference between the alternatives
i:
ρ→ ρˆ =
∑
i
PiρPi. (6)
The second stage is the selection of one individual out-
come from among these alternatives:
ρˆ→ ρi = PiρPi
wi
, wi = tr(ρPi), (7)
in which wi is the probability of obtaining outcome ρi.
This is the Lu¨ders reduction process [33], which is used
in most textbooks for the description of ideal measure-
ments. Regardless of whether one chooses to portray
reduction as real, illusory, emergent, or merely the ac-
quisition of information, it must be taken into account if
one is to make contact with experimental physics [10, 20].
Superselection rules and equivalence classes. The
elimination of interference in Eq. (6) is commonly de-
scribed in decoherence theory as the emergence of an
“environment-induced superselection rule” [21, 22]. A
brief detour into the theory of superselection rules in alge-
braic quantum mechanics [34] is helpful in explaining the
reason for this. Superselection rules are used to imple-
ment the hypothesis that, contrary to the tacit assump-
tion used in most elementary textbooks, not all operators
in Hilbert space correspond to observable quantities.
Let S be some set of operators in Hilbert space. Its
commutant S ′ is defined as the set of bounded operators
that commute with all operators in S; the bicommutant
is defined likewise as S ′′ = (S ′)′. The algebra of observ-
ables generated by the set S is then defined to beA = S ′′;
3it satisfies A = A′′. The basic hypothesis under consid-
eration is that physical quantities in quantum mechanics
are limited to operators in A, or operators whose spectral
decomposition contains only projectors in A.
The nontrivial elements of A′ (i.e., those not propor-
tional to the identity operator) are called superselection
operators. The center of A is defined as Z = A ∩ A′;
operators in Z are called classical observables. In quan-
tum mechanics, it happens to be true that A′ ⊆ A [34],
which implies that Z = A′. In a system with discrete su-
perselection rules (the only type considered here), every
superselection operator is of the form [34]
Λ =
∑
i
λiPi (λi ∈ C, Pi ∈ P). (8)
Here the set P is as shown in Eq. (4), although in general
Pi need not have the form given in Eq. (5). In such a
system, the choice of P completely defines the algebra of
observables, because A is generated by P ′. Conversely,
P is the set of nontrivial projectors contained in A′.
A state in quantum mechanics is defined as a probabil-
ity measure over the set of all projectors P ∈ A [34]. For
a system with no superselection rules, it is well known
that this probability measure can be written as tr(Pρ),
where ρ is a density operator that belongs to A [35].
Quantum states are then in one-to-one correspondence
with density operators [35].
However, this one-to-one correspondence is broken in
a system with superselection rules [34]. A quantum state
can then only be identified with an equivalence class of
density operators
[ρ] = {σ | σ ∼ ρ}, (9)
in which the equivalence relation σ ∼ ρ is defined by
σ ∼ ρ ⇔ tr(Pσ) = tr(Pρ) ∀P ∈ A. (10)
In such a system, a density operator ρ is generally not a
member of A. However, the reduced density operator ρˆ
in Eq. (6) belongs to both A and [ρ]. In fact, ρˆ is the
unique member of the set [ρ] ∩ A [34]. The one-to-one
correspondence between [ρ] and ρˆ then implies that the
equivalence class [ρ] can be represented mathematically
by the reduced density operator ρˆ. The equality ρ = ρˆ
holds if and only if ρ commutes with all Pi ∈ P [34].
The fact that ρˆ is the canonical representative of the
quantum state [ρ] is the foundation for Jauch’s theory of
measurement [36]. From this perspective, the first stage
(6) of the Lu¨ders reduction process is no change at all,
because ρ and ρˆ correspond to the same quantum state
[ρ] = [ρˆ]. The second stage (7) can then be viewed as
merely the selection of one alternative ρi from a classical
statistical mixture ρˆ =
∑
i wiρi. The measurement prob-
lem in quantum mechanics thus “dissolves into a pseudo-
problem” [36].
Equivalence classes from complementarity. A major
conceptual flaw in this approach is that, for a closed sys-
tem, the “observables” in A have little to do with what
is observed in an experiment. According to this theory,
both ρˆ and ρi are considered to be observables, because
they belong to A. However, in an experiment, one cer-
tainly never has access to the full details of the density
operator ρi at the time of reduction. All that one can
really deduce from the location of the apparatus pointer
is that ρi lies somewhere in the subspace Mi defined by
the projector Pi in Eq. (5):
Mi = {σ | Piσ = σPi = σ}. (11)
A more appropriate definition of the quantum state
would take into account this limit on the information
that is actually accessible in an experiment.
Von Neumann has proposed an alternative definition of
equivalence classes, for the special case of systems con-
sisting entirely of integrated subsystems, that is based
directly on the meaningful information content of the re-
duced state [29]. Here von Neumann’s definition is mod-
ified to include the indirect reduction of isolated subsys-
tems as well. In this modified definition, the equivalence
relation (10) is replaced with
σ ∼ ρ ⇔ tr(PiQσ) = tr(PiQρ) ∀Pi ∈ P, Q ∈ Q, (12)
in which P is defined in Eqs. (4) and (5) and Q is the
set of all projectors Q = 1A ⊗ QB that act nontrivially
only in B. The fact that QB is arbitrary means that
the isolated subsystems in B are treated in the same way
as a system without superselection rules in the standard
theory of Eq. (10). However, Pi is limited to the set P
used to perform the reduction that actually takes place
at the given time [29]. This is a concrete implementation
of Bohr’s principle of complementarity [5–7], according
to which (in the memorable phrase coined by Peres [27])
“unperformed experiments have no results.”
The equivalence relation (12) can be rewritten in the
simpler form
σ ∼ ρ ⇔ trA(Piσ) = trA(Piρ) ∀Pi ∈ P, (13)
in which trAX = XB denotes a partial trace over the
subsystems in A, the result of which is an operator in B.
If the equivalence class (9) is now redefined in terms of
this equivalence relation, the reduced density operator ρˆ
in Eq. (6) can no longer serve as the canonical represen-
tative of [ρ]. It must likewise be redefined as
ρˆ =
∑
i
wiρi, ρi = ρ
A
i ⊗ ρBi , (14a)
ρAi =
PAi
dAi
, ρBi =
trA(Piρ)
wi
(wi 6= 0), (14b)
in which wi is the same as before and d
A
i = trP
A
i . Here
ρAi and ρ
B
i are normalized density operators; ρ
B
i is called
the conditional state of B given the state ρAi of A [37].
Such conditional states are used in the definition of quan-
tum discord [31, 38], where they play a role similar to that
of the relative state in Eqs. (2) and (3). Once again, ρBi
4represents an indirect reduction of B that accompanies
the direct reduction of A generated by Pi.
Equation (14) is the main result of this paper. This
modification of the reduced density operator ρˆ brings it
back into one-to-one correspondence with the modified
equivalence class [ρ] (i.e., [ρ] = [σ] if and only if ρˆ = σˆ).
This is a straightforward consequence of the orthogonal-
ity of the projectors in the set (4). Zurek has argued that
such orthogonality is necessary in order for the states of
macroscopic subsystems to be repeatedly accessible (a
criterion closely related to the stability and predictabil-
ity criteria discussed below), using concepts very similar
to the equivalence classes of von Neumann [39].
The entropy of [ρ] can also be defined as that of ρˆ
[29], because ρˆ has the greatest von Neumann entropy
S(ρ) = −k tr(ρ ln ρ) of any member of [ρ]. This can be
seen directly from the definition (14), because ρAi clearly
has the maximum entropy of any state in the subspace
MAi defined by PAi , whereas the value of ρBi is fixed
by the equivalence relation (13). The change of reduced
density operator ρˆ in going from Eq. (6) to Eq. (14) can
thus be thought of as a further stage of coarse-graining in
which all information about the details of any particular
state in MAi is discarded.
Experimental significance. This additional loss of in-
formation has crucial experimental consequences for the
entropy of macroscopic subsystems. As stressed by
Jaynes [40–42], S(ρ) for any density operator ρ that sat-
isfies a given set of macroscopic constraints (such as those
that define the collective variables of integrated subsys-
tems) is related to the experimental entropy Se measured
under the same constraints by S(ρ) ≤ Se, where the
equality holds if and only if S(ρ) has been maximized
with respect to all unconstrained variables in ρ. But
this means that S(ρˆ) = Se for the reduced state (14),
whereas S(ρˆ) 6= Se for the Lu¨ders reduced state (6), be-
cause the latter does not satisfy the maximum-entropy
condition stated in the previous paragraph. Therefore,
even though the Lu¨ders reduction process generates an
increase of entropy in qualitative agreement with the
second law of thermodynamics, it cannot reproduce the
quantitative time dependence of Se. Previous analyses
of entropy changes during the measurement process [43]
have not taken this into account. Attaining the equality
S(ρˆ) = Se was in fact the reason why von Neumann intro-
duced his equivalence-class definition of quantum states
(for the special case of entirely integrated subsystems) in
the first place [29].
The standard formulation of the quantum theory of
measurement is therefore fundamentally flawed. To avoid
this discrepancy with experiment it would be necessary
to restrict the domain of applicability of quantum me-
chanics to microscopic subsystems (excluding measuring
apparatuses), a step that Bohr decisively rejected [5–7].
As Peres has wryly observed [44], such a restriction would
be tantamount to treating measurement as a “supernat-
ural event.”
The two reduction processes also yield somewhat dif-
ferent predictions for the results of measurements on iso-
lated subsystems, although here the difference is more
subtle. The difference occurs because the Lu¨ders reduc-
tion process selects one particular state in the manifold
MAi —generally not a maximum-entropy state. This dif-
ference should, however, be statistically insignificant, at
least in the short term, because nearly all of the states in
MAi would lead to the same short-term dynamics of the
collective variables.
Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi [45] used ergodic theory
to justify a reduced density operator that is similar to
Eq. (14), except that their ρBi is a pure state obtained
by direct reduction. Such a definition generally disagrees
with the result (14b) of indirect reduction and thus dis-
agrees with experiment. These authors also did not point
out the experimental implications of their theory for the
entropy of macroscopic subsystems. Their formulation of
the reduction process thus never managed to supersede
the standard formulation, and it has since fallen into half
a century of disuse.
Consistency of the theoretical description. Although
ρ and ρˆ correspond to the same quantum state [ρ] = [ρˆ],
one may question whether the replacement of ρ with ρˆ
could lead to any inconsistency in the theoretical descrip-
tion. The key to avoiding inconsistency is that the time
interval ∆t between reductions should be chosen to sat-
isfy
τdec  ∆t τP , (15)
in which τdec is the maximum decoherence time for the
integrated subsystems in A and τP is the timescale for
changes in the projector set P. The condition ∆t τdec
ensures that different reductions do not interfere with
one another, whereas ∆t τP expresses the requirement
that P change slowly in time. The latter is a stability
constraint that ensures the reduction process ρ → ρˆ can
be regarded as emergent [32] prior to the introduction
of the equivalence class [ρ] = [ρˆ]. The satisfaction of
the conditions (15) is contingent upon the initial quan-
tum state and the definition of P. The latter is chosen
here in accordance with a modified version [32] of Zurek’s
predictability sieve [22], in which P is defined so as to
generate the least entropy during the interval ∆t.
Another conceivable source of inconsistency has been
discussed by d’Espagnat [46]. This arises because a mea-
suring apparatus in A and its corresponding measured
subsystem in B are entangled in ρ but not in ρˆ. One
could therefore conceivably perform a measurement on
the composite system (of apparatus and isolated subsys-
tem) that would reveal this entanglement, thus demon-
strating an inconsistency in the reduction process ρ→ ρˆ.
The reason why this is not an actual source of in-
consistency has nothing to do with the fact that such
a secondary measurement would be technologically de-
manding. It is instead due to the fact that a measuring
apparatus can only function as such if it is truly inte-
grated [47–49] (i.e., if it interacts strongly with its envi-
ronment, thereby generating significant entanglement on
5the timescale τdec). In order for a secondary measure-
ment to reveal the entanglement between the primary
apparatus and the isolated subsystem, it would there-
fore be necessary to isolate the primary apparatus from
its environment (e.g., by cooling it down to a very low
temperature, among other things). But this changes the
experimental arrangement in such a way that the primary
apparatus no longer functions as a measuring device. The
secondary measurement thus fails to demonstrate an in-
consistency in the theoretical description of the primary
measurement; it merely replaces one experiment with an
entirely different experiment. This illustrates once again
the importance of the concept that “unperformed exper-
iments have no results” [6, 27].
Conceptual difficulties of the type described above can
often be avoided by thinking of a measurement as some-
thing that we infer has happened from the correlations
between subsystems in the reduced state ρˆ, rather than
an active intervention performed by an agent upon an-
other subsystem. It should be stressed here that the
presumed freedom of an experimenter to manipulate the
conditions of an experiment is actually a necessary pre-
requisite for the pragmatic description of experimental
physics [6, 48]. The use of descriptive language involving
active agents is therefore not incorrect—however, the va-
lidity of such a description emerges only on a timescale
τfw  τP , when the behavior of the agent becomes so un-
predictable that the concept of “free will” can be invoked
without fear of contradiction. Maintaining a conceptual
distinction between the emergence of outcomes [32] on
the timescale ∆t and the emergence of free will on the
timescale τfw is therefore crucial for logical consistency.
Origins in decoherence theory. The mathematical
form of the reduced state ρˆ in Eq. (14) was derived from
two of the core principles of complementarity: (1) that
we obtain information about isolated subsystems exclu-
sively through their interactions with integrated subsys-
tems and (2) that unperformed experiments have no re-
sults. These principles have hitherto been treated more
or less as axioms of the Copenhagen interpretation.
However, both are corollaries of the most basic princi-
ple of decoherence theory—namely, that all information
in quantum mechanics must be extracted from structures
in the quantum state that are stable in time. This prin-
ciple of dynamical stability is the reason why pointer
variables are required to be robust under environmental
monitoring. As discussed previously, it is implemented
mathematically by using the predictability sieve to iden-
tify stable subsystems and projectors.
Principle (1) is just a special case of the dynamical
stability principle, because the integrated subsystems in
principle (1) are derived from the predictability sieve.
Examples of such subsystems include measuring instru-
ments whose pointers are described by quasiclassical col-
lective variables. Isolated subsystems, by contrast, are
fragile and have no stable properties that can be defined
independently of the integrated subsystems with which
they interact.
Principle (2) then follows immediately, because the
dynamically stable pointer variables are not arbitrary.
Subsystems and basis states can indeed be chosen arbi-
trarily, but essentially only one such configuration yields
dynamically stable experimental information. A given
quantum state cannot be described in terms of differ-
ent experimental arrangements leading to different (i.e.,
complementary) types of experimental information. All
experimental arrangements other than the dynamically
stable one must be regarded as unperformed.
Common ground. As shown above, the principle of
dynamical stability in decoherence theory leads to sev-
eral key elements of Bohr’s principle of complementarity,
which in turn have definite implications for the mathe-
matical structure of the quantum state. The expression
of these results in mathematical form clarifies the mean-
ing of complementarity and makes it easier for everyone
to “get the hang of it.” However, this mode of derivation
also shows that the significance of these results extends
beyond the philosophy of the Copenhagen interpretation.
The extraction of dynamically stable experimental infor-
mation is an operational issue that must be dealt with
at some point by every interpretation of quantum me-
chanics. This is highlighted by the fact that the mod-
ified definition of the quantum state proposed here has
unambiguous experimental implications for the entropy
of macroscopic subsystems. This establishes an area of
common ground that may help to bring different workers
in the field of quantum foundations closer together.
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